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Introduction
The question of whether Mexico should adopt the U.S. dollar involves a broad range of questions, ranging from the effects of details of a conversion process 1 Conversion issues include procedures for negotiations on one-time or ongoing payments of seigniorage from the United States, procedures tying any ongoing payments to total real dollar balances held in Mexico and procedures for measuring that total; choice of an exchange rate for conversion of nominal contracts denominated in pesos, education programs to create familiarity with dollars and associated U.S. coins, changes in accounting procedures and rules for tax collections; procedures for physical conversion and distribution of dollars to people and businesses, etc.
2 These issues include effects of dollarization on political pressures from Mexico to the Federal Reserve, Mexican nationalism the chance that blame would center on the United States for various future economic problems in Mexico, as spillovers from differences in opinion on monetary policies (broadly defined) for other issues such as immigration, drug laws and enforcement, free trade and various forms of protectionism (including environmental, health, and safety laws and regulations), and issues of human rights and procedures of democracy.
one system over the other rises as the economy becomes less flexible in its responses to shocks.
Many factors can alter these conclusions. For example, a central bank can respond to domestic money-demand shocks automatically by policies that target a domestic nominal interest rate or price level rather than a monetary aggregate. Many central banks, including the Federal Reserve, routinely follow such policies. The ability to follow these policies reduces the advantage of a common currency (or true fixed exchange-rate system) even in the presence of dominant domestic money-demand shocks.
A similar caveat applies to the argument that a fixed exchange-rate system provides monetary discipline, and that a common currency enhances this discipline by eliminating the option of devaluation. While a common currency or fixed exchange-rate system can provide discipline, other mechanisms can also provide discipline, as illustrated by cross-sectional studies of the effects of central bank independence and by the monetary experience of New
Zealand. Perhaps the political will that is necessary for adoption of a fixed exchange rate or common currency would be sufficient for adoption of alternative mechanisms of monetary discipline (while retaining some measure of monetary independence).
4
Little research has focused on the political economy of a common currency, particularly in the presence of differences in real shocks across countries. Regional factors within the United States --such as the decline of the "rustbelt," or the different regional effects of a shock to world oil prices, or the different regional effects of changes in international competition (such as in automobiles) -have created regional political battles within the Federal Reserve over monetary policies. Two countries with different real shocks, or that respond differently to the same real shocks, would also experience political battles over monetary policy. Would adoption of a common currency reduce or raise the real 4 The flip-side of this argument is that flexible exchange rates are desirable because they provide the option for a nation to pursue its own monetary policies. Whether that option is a benefit or curse depends on factors such as how political forces operate within the nation's institutions to affect its policies. Perhaps the political forces necessary for adoption of a common currency could instead be channeled to adoption of institutional arrangements that would permit wiser choices of future monetary policies by a domestic agency. Similarly, the usual case for floating exchange rates over a common currency ignores any real-resource costs of changes in exchange rates. The main objection to floating exchange rates is that we don't know if the market will respond "correctly" to exogenous shocks (with the exchange rate adjusting to its new equilibrium level) and that speculative factors won't create changes in exchange rates that create "new" shocks. Economists currently lack a well-corroborated theory of exchange rates. However, if a significant fraction of movements in exchange rates result from speculative factors (as many economists suspect), and if these movements have real resource costs, then the presence of these shocks may provide an additional advantage for a common currency over multiple currencies with floating exchange rates. 5 While existing studies show little differences in the behavior of real GDP, employment, or international trade across exchange-rate systems (with the only obvious difference appearing in the variability of the real exchange rate), and little connection between these exchange-rate changes and the behavior of fundamental variables, existing evidence does not preclude the possibility of substantial real resource costs from exchange-rate variability. 6 Evidence does not suggest a strong effect of exchange-rate variability on the magnitude of international trade. 7 However, Duarte (1999) shows -in a model that captures these main features of the data, with only the exchange rate showing greater variability under a floating-rate system --that the exchange-rate system nevertheless affects welfare.
A separate argument for a common currency (or true fixed exchange-rate system) over multiple currencies involves the transactions costs of changing currencies, and associated information-processing costs of translating prices from unfamiliar to familiar terms. However, the size of these costs is fairly small and declining over time. The cost of translating prices between dollars and pesos, for example, involves a multiplication or division problem which involves a conversion factor remains constant (even under floating rates) across different products bought at the same date, and that remains at least approximately constant over short periods of time under a floating exchange-rate system. In contrast, people deal everyday with multiplication or division problems that involve a different conversion factors across products. For example, does a 12-pack at $6.99 represent a better bargain than a 6-pack at $2.99? Does the 36-oz size of a product at $4.79 represent a better bargain than a 22-oz size at $2.79? Because most people face currency conversion problems less frequently than the latter problems (in which factors of multiplication or division differ for each problem), the total real costs associated with currency conversion problems is probably much smaller. Moreover, currency-conversion costs have fallen with 6 See Baxter and Stockman (1989) and Flood and Rose (1995) . An important but neglected channel through which a common currency is likely to affect economic performance operates through the policies of central banks that affect financial intermediation. Adoption of a common currency implies far more than reduced transactions costs and monetary discipline; it implies a change in an institution that plays a central role in the governance and operation of the nation's system of financial intermediaries, and a change in the intricate connections between the nation's monetary system and credit (intermediation) system. Because financial intermediation plays keys role in long-term economic growth and (perhaps) in business cycles, the question of whether to adopt a common currency involves the issue of optimal central bank areas. Based on recent developments in the theory of financial markets and evidence that financial intermediation plays a key role in long-term economic growth, the long-run impact of this issue may dominate the other costs and benefits associated with adoption of a common currency.
8 Another unresolved question is whether this currency speculation is "extra" speculation that would not affect the economy if it were to adopt a common currency, or whether the (limited) time and resources of speculators and noise traders that impact the exchange rate under a floating-rate system would find other outlets under a common currency, resulting in greater speculative effects on other financial variables (such as stock markets, derivative financial instruments, etc.). Levine (1997) surveys the literature connecting financial development with economic growth. Financial intermediation may enhance economic growth by channeling savings into the most productive investments, assisting in diversification to reduce risks and raise investment, raise the rate of technological growth by facilitating investments in research and development, channeling investments from less productive but more liquid investments into more productive (though less liquid) projects, and through other channels. Each of these channels may be affected by the institutional change in central banks that would accompany adoption of a common currency.
The relevant issues include not only the purely economic costs and benefits of a single central bank (versus multiple central banks) for a banking system that spans across diverse regions and nations, but also the economic consequences of the changes in political forces that would impinge on a single central bank (as opposed to separate central banks).
Economists too often neglect these political-economy aspects of central bank policies, though clearly a substantial amount of financial-market (and institution) regulation in the United States has been implemented as a way to provide subsidized services or credit to various special groups (think of the U.S. Community Reinvestment Act or the "window guidance" practiced at the Bank of Japan, as well as entry restrictions and geographical restrictions on financial institutions) to protect certain groups from competition (think of regulations that protect entrenched management by impeding hostile takeovers). It is for reasons like these that the financial services sector is the largest single source of political action committee (PAC) money in the United States (Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998).
Mexico, like the United States, clearly sees the results of such political pressures -Umlauf (1993) found that when Mexico temporarily switched from auctioning its treasury bills with a multiple-price auction (in which each winning bidder pays his bid) to a single-price auction (in which all winners pay the same price), the profits of bidders -financial institutions, mainly -fell; apparently buyers had less success at collusion and manipulation of the latter auctions, and (probably due to political pressures) Mexico switched back to the former system.
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These issues --of political pressures on policies and the effects of changes in institutional arrangements on the political equilibrium --become particularly important when one of the nations has a particularly fragile banking system. Much evidence (as well as economic theory) indicates that banking crises and currency crises are intertwined, each contributing to the other. Consequently, one might be tempted to advocate a common currency to eliminate the possibility of a currency crisis. However, the change in central bank institutions and policies that accompanies adoption of a common currency could raise rather than reduce the economic problems associated with banking crises, or adversely affect the functions of financial intermediaries, reducing investment and economic growth. King and Levine (1993) provide evidence that financial development helps predict subsequent growth (over the next one to three decades). However, because prediction does not imply causality, their evidence may admit other interpretations than the conclusion that These issues are relevant not just for long-term growth but also for business cycles.
Some evidence in the past decade has supported the argument of Bernanke and Gertler (1987) that reductions in bank capital cause reductions in bank lending, which reduce investment, and that this mechanism plays an important role in business cycles. Considerable confusion has arisen in many recent discussions of lender-of-last-resort policies because of differences in the use of that term. For purposes of this paper, define lender-of-last-resort policy as lending to illiquid but solvent financial institutions -with sufficient collateral for the loan in the absence of a liquidity problem -to prevent a fall in the nominal money supply (measured by some broad monetary aggregate) that would otherwise result from disintermediation, whether occurring through a rise in the currency-deposit ratio or a rise in the reserve-to-loan ratio of intermediaries. Lender-of-last-resort policy becomes relevant only in a system-wide banking crisis. When an isolated bank has a liquidity problem, it can borrow on financial markets and does not require a loan from a lender of last resort (unless the central bank knows more about the isolated bank's condition than does the market, or some other problems hinder the normal operation of financial markets). If an isolated bank becomes insolvent, a lender of last resort would not lend to it (at least in the presence of deposit insurance). 10 However, if a sufficiently large group of banks develops a liquidity problem, that group can borrow on financial markets only if there is a sufficiently large set of lenders available (with sufficient funds for short-term loans) and willing to lend at some interest rate that does not create new problems of insolvency. In a closed economy, a system-wide liquidity problem among banks may require a lender of last resort (meaning that, in its absence, a fall of the money supply and associated disintermediation would impose large costs on the economy).
Consider an economy consisting of two countries, Mexico and the United States, with local lending and locally correlated real shocks that affect financial intermediation (such as shocks that affect the value of collateral that firms have pledged on bank loans, or total savings available to banks for loans, or total bank "capital" available for banks to invest. With two central banks, each "captured" by the local banking industry through its political influence, each has an incentive to help cartelize, separately, the local banks under their jurisdictions. The resulting equilibrium is likely to be inefficient as these competing cartels overexploit common resources -such as the rents to be gained from the acquisition and use of investors' funds. In contrast, a single central bank prevents this overexploitation by internalizing the effects of policies on the entire banking system (weighted by its political influence on policy). However, although a common central bank creates more efficient use of investor funds, it also redistributes more aggregate rents to members of the cartel and away from other parties (depositors, investors, and firms that borrow to finance investments).
These issues are not unique to central banks, of course -the same issues arise with inefficiences from competition among state and local governments within a country in setting tax rates, regulations, and subsidies to attract new businesses. The offsetting benefit in that case, which perhaps also applies to central banks (to the extent that financial institutions are free to move their operations across countries and thereby to choose, to some extent, the central bank that will have jurisdiction over them), involves the benefits of competition between governments (as in Tiebout, 19$$, and the large literature it has spawned).
Similarly 
A Simple Intermediation Model With Moral Hazard
Begin, for simplicity, with a model that focuses on moral hazard problems associated with bank lending but that ignores the bargaining power over rents that has become a central feature of recent work in corporate finance (e.g. Rajan, 19$$$). Consider a 3-nation world with (a) a large "rest-or-world" nation that will not be analyzed, and (b) two ex ante identical countries, each with three types of agents: firms, investors, and banks. These agents live 2 periods, making financial, investment, and effort decisions in the first period, that, together with random events, lead to real and financial outcomes in the second period.
The description of each national economy is similar to that in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) . All agents are risk neutral. There is a continuum of firms, each with its own ex ante identical investment project, and firms differ only in the internal funds they have available,
A , to finance their own investment projects. The cumulative distribution functions G(A) in the "home" country, and G*(A*) in the "foreign" country, summarize their ex ante differences.
As in Holmstrom and Tirole, it is useful to assume initially that the scales of investment projects are fixed at I >0. If a firm has assets AI < , then it requires IA − in external funds to finance its investment project. Investment generates a verifiable return of either 0 or 0 R > at t=2. Three situations are possible for each investment project: (1) a "good" situation in which the firm exerts a high level of (unobserved and unverifiable) effort, resulting in a probability H p of a "good:" investment outcome (a return of R); (2) a "bad" situation in which the firm exerts a low level of (unobserved and unverifiable) effort, resulting in a probability LH pp <of a "good" investment outcome, but with a private return to the firm (from the reduced effort level) of 0 π Π>> , and (3) a "very bad" situation in which the firm exerts a medium level of (unobserved and unverifiable) effort, resulting in a probability LH pp <of a "good" investment outcome (the same probability as if the firm exerted low effort), but with a private return to the firm (from the reduced effort level) of With free international capital movements between the home and foreign counties, but with imperfect capital movements between this block and the rest of the world, the demand for bank capital within the 2-nation block is This section modifies the model to add those elements, though it requires simplifying the model in certain dimensions. In particular, suppose that banking is a perfectly competitive industry. That assumption allows us to proceed along the lines of the banking model developed by Rajan (1997, 1999) . Again assume a three-period economy, but add the assumptions of risk-neutrality and no discounting. Each entrepreneur has one idea for an investment project in which he has specific human capital. These Assume also that '' 33 ss yx >., which says that entrepreneurs can always pay more than the liquidation value at t = 3.
Suppose monitoring a borrower takes time, so savers rely on "banks" as intermediaries to lend to entrepreneurs and monitor them, and that each bank can only monitor one entrepreneur. Assume that educating a lender about a project takes time, so each entrepreneur can borrow from at most one bank, and only banks --not savers --can obtain the liquidation value of the project . Finally, assume that to obtain the full liquidation value of a project, a bank must supply its expertise (gained in the process of monitoring) to that project. Savers themselves (lacking such expertise) can collect only a fraction α of this liquidation value. However, banks cannot credibly commit to provide their expertise following the liquidation of a project. Courts will enforce debt contracts and transfers of collateral to the lender in the event of default. Each entrepreneur promises to make payments z t to the bank at dates t. If the entrepreneur failed to make a payment, he defaults and loses the project to the bank. (There are no partial defaults.)
A key insight is this: because entrepreneurs cannot commit effort in advance, they may attempt to renegotiate any previously signed contract. If an entrepreneur attempts to renegotiate a previously-signed contract by offering payments { z % } in place of payments {z} (and simultaneously committing to some current level of effort), then the lender can accept the offer, or reject it and seize the project, or reject it and but not seize the project (at least, not at the current date), or reject it and sell his the loan. Diamond and Rajan show that because banks cannot commit to provide their expertise to a liquidated project, they can threaten to pay only α of the liquidation value to lenders. Such renegotiation allows banks to capture a portion of the rent from their expertise, which is x(1-α), (conditional upon a liquidation).
If bargaining between banks and savers results in banks retaining half the rent, or --conditional on liquidation --x(1-α)/2, then savers then get
(1)(1) 22
Consequently, the market value of the bank loan is (1)2 x α + . Assuming that banks cannot negotiate with only a subset of savers or distinguish between them in such negotiations, the bank can commit not to renegotiate with savers. The idea is that the bank can offer demand deposits with a sequential service constraint as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) . With these deposits, a run on the bank would occur if there were a chance that it would try to renegotiate with savers. Assume that if a bank experiences a run, then depositors acquire claims to its loan, and the entrepreneur can make depositors an offer, which (like the bank) they can either accept or reject. The depositors also have the option of hiring the bank to obtain the full liquidation value of the loan (which they can do for half the banks rent, as above). Diamond and Rajan prove that the entrepreneur can make a (weakly) better offer to depositors than can the bank, keeping the bank's rent to zero. Consequently, demand deposits help the bank to create "liquidity,"
i.e. the bank can borrow more from depositors than the market value of the loan.
In contrast to the previous section, we now turn to the separation of monitoring and investment within a bank. Assume, in contrast to the previous section, that "banks" have no funds of their own. Bank capital does not belong to the banker himself, but to investors who provide funds and with whom the banker must negotiate a contractual arrangement.
Assume that depositors provide d t < z t of the funds that the bank lends to the firm, and that these other residual-claim-holders provide the remaining assets. In that case, a bank can collect rent on its expertise. The residual-claim-holders need the bank to provide its expertise (gained in the process of monitoring), just as the bank needs their money. So they bargain to share the rent. Assume that in these negotiations between banks and residualclaim-holders, they split rents equally.
Consider the final-period results, at date t=3. Let z % = payment promised by entrepreneur at t=1 to be made to the bank at t=3. Diamond and Rajan prove that if deposits were chosen (in the previous period) to be sufficiently high, then a run occurs at t=3 and the bank earns no rent. With a sufficiently low level of deposits (and high level of investment from residual claim holders), there is no run and the division of rents between the bank and investors depends on parameters of the model. The middle case, with a medium level of deposits, leads to no bank run with banks and investors sharing the rent. Assuming that bank runs have a real cost, this result implies a tradeoff in which the economy can have greater levels of intermediation and real investment, but at the cost of greater financialmarket fragility and enhanced chance of bank runs (with their attendant costs).
INCOMPLETE -equilibrium to be added
Results
This section considers the effects of randomness in collateral values at firms -in the liquidation value of a project that banks can attain by providing their (limited) expertise, and/or the liquidation value that investors can achieve (without such expertise). We also consider the effects of shocks to available savings, and of central bank policies of (a) acting as a lender of last resort, and (b) instituting a state-contingent subsidy on banks that are "too big to fail." We then turn to the benefits and costs of a single central bank rather than two separate central banks.
RESULTS TO BE ADDED

Remarks (Incomplete)
In contrast to the standard literature on optimal currency areas, the tradeoffs involved in optimal central bank areas are more complex. On the one hand, there is a tradeoff between the gains from a common central bank that follow from reliance on the law of large numbers and the gains from separate central banks that follow from the standard optimal-currency-area arguments. The gains from each rise with asymmetries across countries in certain real shocks. Consequently, although standard statements have been taken to imply that losses from fixed exchange rates rise (gains from floating) rise with increases in different real shocks across countries, those different real shocks also raise the size of the gains from a common central bank. The analysis is complicated by the politicaleconomy issues -central bank policies respond to political pressures.
